PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

With one judge dissenting the Supreme Court of Vermon decides in Stanly v. Payne, 62, Atl., 495, that where
~etaking defendant, on the expiration of his leasie of a
Possession of farm, obtained the landlord's permission to
Property
leave a certain box in the barn, and thereafter
defendant visited the farm and told the then tenant that the
box was his and that he intended to take it, it was not sufficient to place the tenant in the attitude of a wrongdoer and
justify defendant in the use of force and violence to get
possession of his box. With this case compare Kirby v.
Foster, 17 R. I. 437, 14 L. R. A. 317.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
In Silverman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 141 Fed. 382, the
United States Circuit Court, S. D., New York, holds that
Substitution a party has an absolute right to change his
of Attorneys attorney at any time, and while the court may,
in its discretion, compel him to pay for services rendered
as a condition of substitution, it will not do so where the case
was taken on a contract for a contingent fee which is of
doubtful validity, but will order the substitution and leave
the attorney to his remedy by suit. See in connection herewith editorial note to 69 C. C. A., I 13.
BANKRUPTCY.
The United States District Court of Arkansas, E. D., decides In re Blount, 142 Fed. 163, that an insolvent having
Dceet ~more than twelve creditors cannot defeat bankDfeat Pro- ruptcy proceedings against him by transferring
ceedings
his property for the benefit of some of his creditors leaving less than three unprovided for, but leaving the
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preferred creditors actually unpaid for the purpose of requiring them to be counted so that those remaining will be insufficient in number to maintain a petition in bankruptcy. Compare Leighton v. Kennedy, 129 Fed. 737.
In Samuel v. Dodd, 142 Fed. 68, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, decides that an order
imprionment requiring a bankrupt to pay over money or surfor Debt
render preperty forming part of his estate is not
one for the payment of a debt, and his commitment for refusing to obey such an order is not an imprisonment for debt.
The United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania, decides In re Weiss, 142 Fed. 279, that the failure of an insolvent debtor to discharge the preference obAct of
Bankruptcy tained by a judgment creditor by the levy of an
execution cannot be charged as an act of bankruptcy, where
the levy was procured by the attorney for the petitioning
creditors for the sole purpose of laying the foundation for
the bankruptcy proceedings. Compare Simonson v. Sinsheimer, 95 Fed 948.
In Dickas v. Barnes, 14o Fed., 849, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, dicides that a court of
Partnership bankruptcy, which is administering the estate
of a bankrupt partnership, has jurisdiction, as
incidental thereto, to take possession of the property of a
partner, although he has not been and could not be adjudged
a bankrupt individually, and to administer the same as far
as necessary to a settlement of the partnership estate.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, decides in Sturgiss v. Corbin, 141 Fed., i, that a court
of bankruptcy has power to order the sale of any
Sales of
Property
property of a bankrupt clear of incumbrances,
and also, in its discretion, to appoint commissioners to
make the sale; there being no requirement that such sales
shall be made by the trustee.
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BILLS AND NOTES.

In Interstate Nat. Bank v. Ringo, 83 Pac., II9, it appeared that a bank holding a note for collection delivered
it to an endorser on the day of maturity, in
Payment
*exchange for the indorser's cheque upon another
bank, and after inquiring by telephone of the drawee bank
about the cheque, and being told through a mistake as to
what cheque was meant that it would be paid, entered the
amount to the credit of the owner of the note. On the next
day, payment of the cheque, which at no time was good, was
refused for want of funds, and the collecting bank delivered
it to the drawer and in return received the note of its principal. Under these facts the Supreme Court of Kansas
decides that the transactions did not effect the payment of
the note. Compare Cheltenham Stone &c Co. v. Gates Iron
Works 124 Ill., 623.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides in
Haskell v. Boston District Messenger Co., 76 N. E., 215,
Messenger that where a bill for rent was intrusted to a
Company
messenger furnished by a messenger company
and the amount collected by the messenger, the company did
not become a common carrier and insurer of the bill and the
money. The knowledge, it is said, of a messenger company
that messengers sent out by it were sometimes employed to
carry money does not render the company a common carrier
where the company exercises no control over the messenger
during his employment by a patron. Compare Linnehan v.
Rollins, 137 Mass., 123.
The rule that a carrier owes to a passenger the duty of
exercising care to protect him from injury or insult is well
Misonct established and has been applied as establishing
of Servants absolute liability where the employee of the
carrier on the train whereon the passenger is riding, injures
him. It is extended in Hayne v. Union St. Ry. Co., 76 N.E.,
2I9 to a case where the injury is inflicted by an employee of
the carrier belonging to a different crew from that of the
train on which the passenger was riding. The facts in the
case were that the conductor of one of defendant's cars
25
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CARRIERS (Continued).

in sport threw a dead hen at the motorman of the car on
which plaintiff was riding. The hen missed the motorman,
struck the window of the car near where plaintiff was sitting and injured her. Compare Bryant v. Rich, io6 Mass.,
i8o.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 26 S. C. R., 330, the United States Supreme Court
Discrimination: decides that a discrimination forbidden by the
Routing by ni- Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, is not made
tial Cers

by the adoption by common carriers, as part of

an agreement for a through rate from California to the East,
for oranges and other citrus fruits, of a rule under which
the right of routing beyond its own terminal is reserved to
the initial carrier as the condition of guaranteeing the
through rates to the shipper, where such rule has served,
as was intended, to break up rebating by the connecting lines,
and, in its practical operation, the actual routing is generally
conceded to the shipper and his requests to divert shipments
en route are usually allowed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, decides in Williamson v. Liverpool & London Globe
Ins. Co., 141 Fed., 54, that a state statute providEa
Protecio
ing that " in any action against any insurance
of the Laws company to recover the amount of any
loss
under a policy of fire, life, marine or other insurance, if it
appear from the evidence that such company has vexatiously
refused to pay such loss the court or jury may ....
allow the plaintiff damages not exceeding ten per cent. on
the amount of the loss, and a reasonable attorney's fee," is
not void as in violation of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Compare
herewith Gulf &c. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S., 150.
In Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company v. John
A. Mayes, 26 S. C. R., 491, the United States Supreme
Interstate Court decides that, as applied to interstate shipCommerce ments, a provision of the Texas statutes which
penalizes the failure of a railway company to furnish cars to

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

a shipper, within a certain number of days after the latter's
requisition in writing, in the sum of $25 per day for each
car not so furnished, and admits of no excuse except such as
arises from "strikes or other public calamity," is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. Compare
Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S., 287.

In In re O'Neill, 83 Pac., 104, the Supreme Court of
Washington decides that an act which prohibits any one but
a duly authorized agent of a railroad to sell railTicket
way transportation; requires such agent to be
Brokeragewat
provided with a certificate from
the railroad

showing his authority, and to have a fixed place of business in
which his certificate shall be conspicuously shown; makes it
unlawful for any one not possessed of such certificate to sell
railroad transportation or to set up, establish, and conduct
any office or place of business for the sale or transfer of railroad transportation, does not as to a ticket broker established
in business previous to its passage violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution guaranteeing due
process of law, but is a valid exercise of the police power in
the prevention of the perpetration of possible frauds on the
public by the unauthorized sale of railroad tickets. Compare
Ex ParteLorencen, 128 Cal., 431; 5o L. R. A., 55.

CONVICTS.

In Henry v. State, 39 Southern, 856, the Supreme Court
of -Mississippi decides that a contract whereby the board of
Contracts

control of the penitentiary agreed to work a

plantation with convicts, and to receive a certain
sum from the owner, who was to receive the crops, the convicts to remain under the supervision and control of the
board, was a lease of the land, and not a hiring of the convicts to the owner.. One judge dissents. The case is a
very elaborate and thorough review and discussion oi
the question involved. It is well worthy of careful study.
for Labor
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CORPORATIONS.

In Mandeziille v. Courtright, 142 Fed., 97, it appeared
that defendants, all of whom were stockholders and officers
Jersey, caused
Conducting of a company incorporated in New
Pennsylvania,
in
in
the
State
of
an gegal
to
be
conducted
Business
the name of the corporation, the business of
dentistry which the corporation had no charter right to carry
on there, and which was in violation of a law of the state.
Plaintiff, in ignorance of the existence of such a corporation, and supposing that she was in the hands of licensed dentists, submitted to an operation by an authorized employee
of the establishment, who performed the work so negligently
as to fracture plaintiff's jaw-bone and cause her serious
injury. Under these facts the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, Third Circuit, decides that defendants could not
avoid personal liability for the injury by setting up the
charter of the company, but that, each having knowingly
and actively participated in conducting the business in
violation of law, they were liable as partners for all acts
done in connection therewith. Compare Guckert v. Hacke,
159 Pa., 3o3.

The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey decides
in O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 62 Atl., 408, that
where a corporation A has acquired all the
Action by
Stockholder
capital stock of corporation B, and at the time of
such acquisition corporation B owned and held a large
number of the shares of the capital stock of corporation A,
the officers and directors of neither corporation have the
right at a stockholders' meeting of corporation A, held
for purpose of electing directors of that corporation, to vote
upon the shares of the stock of corporation A held by
corporation B at the time of the acquisition of its stock
by corporation A.
The general rule that a corporation cannot enter into a
valid contract of guaranty is of course in the ordinary cases
well settled. A modification of this principle
Ouaranty: appears in Whitehead v. American Lamp &
Ultra Vires
Brass Co., 62 Atl., 554, where the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey decides that where defendant corporation, engaged in a manufacturing business, agreed to
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guaranty the indebtedness of a third person for materials
to be used in the manufacture of goods for such corporation, which could not have been obtained but for such
guaranty, it was estopped, after obtaining the benefit thereof, to deny its liability on the ground that the contract
was ultra vires. Compare Hohnes v. Willard, 125 N. Y.,
75, 11 L. R. A., 170; and the very recent decision In re New
York Car Wheel Works, 141 Fed., 430.
In Denver City Tramway Co. v. Norton, 141 Fed. 599 the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
Jurisdictional
Amount

decides that under the Judiciary Act the amount

in dispute or matter in controversey determining
the jurisdiction of the court, is the amount demanded in
the petition in good faith, and not the amount ultimately
recovered. See also notes to Aver v. Lembard, 19 C. C. A.
75 and to Tennent-StriblingShoe Co., v. Roper, 36 C. C. A.
459.
DEAD BODIES.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) decides in Jackson v. Savage, 96 N. Y. Supp.,
366, that a husband has a right of action for the
rlutiiation
dissection of the body of his deceased wife without his permission, or without the permission of the wife
given during her life-time. Compare Foley, v. Phelps, 37
N. Y. Supp., 471.
EQUITY.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit, decides in Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. v. Chicago
E. I. R. Co., 141 Fed. 785, that a contract
Jurisdiction:&
Pserforrance* by a lessee railroad company to run its .trains
over the tracks and use terminal facilities of

the lessor during the term of a lease for 999 years and pay
rental on a wheelage basis, if clearly established and valid,
is specifically enforceable in equity on the ground of the
avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, which would be vexatious and expensive and in which the relief obtainable would
be inadequate. See also Penna. R. R. Co., v. St. Louis &c.
Ry. Co., 18 U. S. 29o.
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FRAUD.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit decides in Kell v. Trencherd, 142 Fed., 16, that the
False Represen measure of damages recoverable in an action for
tationsfraud and deceit, based upon a sale induced by
false representations made by the seller, is the
Damages
difference between the actual value of what the purchaser
parted with and the actual value of what he received. The
damages may also include outlays legitimately attributable
to the fraud.

HABEAS CORPUS.

It is decided by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in Mackenzie v. Barrett, 141 Fed.
964, that one under arrest, but at large on bail,
Nature of
Restraint
is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, the same
as if the arrest was accompanied by actual imprisonment,
the purpose of the writ being to test the right of the court
or other body issuing the process to detain the person for any
purpose by restraining him of his right to go without question. Compare Ex parte Balz, 177 U. S. 389.

INJUNCTION.

In Beck v. Indianapolis Light & Power Co., 76 N. E.,
312, the Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2, decides
supply o that where a contract to purchase electric current
for a period of five years provided that, in conElectricity
sideration of the rate fixed, the consumer should not use any
electric current on the premises not furnished by complainant,
complainant was entitled to an injunction to restrain the consumer from so using current furnished by others, though the
contract was not one that a court of equity could compel
defendant to specifically perform. Compare Philadelphia

Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202, Pa.

210.
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INSURANCE.

In Reagan v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 N. E., 217, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides that a provision in a life policy making it incontestable for
. fraud from the date of the policy is invalid and
the insurer, in an action on the policy, may rely on fraudulent
representations prior to the issuance of the policy, notwithstanding that by the terms of the policy the entire contract
is contained in it and the application; holding, however, that
a provision in a life policy, making it incontestable for
fraud after the expiration of a specified time, is valid and
binding on the insurer. See also Wright v. Mitt. Benefit
Life Ass'n., i18 N. Y., 237.
Incontestabilaty

JUDGMENTS.

The public press has already given considerable notice to
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Haddock
Full Faith
and Credit

v. Haddock, 26 S. C. R., 525, with reference

to the recognition which must be given in one
state to a divorce decree by the courts of another. The
principle established by the case by a majority of five judges
to four is that the mere domicil within the state of one party
to the marriage, where such domicil is not the matrimonial
domicil, does not give the courts of that state jurisdiction to
render a decree of divorce enforceable in all the other states
by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution against a non-resident who did not appear and
was only constructively served with notice of the pendency
of the action. It is of course impossible to give any adequate
idea of the decision in this department of the LAW REGISTER.
The prevailing opinion, written by Mr. Justice White, apart
from its value as a precedent on the facts before the court,
is a most excellent review and summary of the principles
which have been established by the prior adjudications of
the court with reference to divorce. Compare Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

In Lamberida v. Barnum, 90 S. W., 698, the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas decides that where a right of action
to recover certain real estate accrued to a marTackln
Disabllitles Iried woman during coverture, and she died
while the right of action existed, leaving minor heirs, such
heirs could not set up their disability of infancy as an excuse
for not having brought their action within the time limited
by the statute. Compare Chevallier v. Durst, 6 Tex., 239.
NEGLIGENCE.

In McMahen v. White, 30 Pa. Super. Ct., 169, it is decided
that where an owner of a vehicle accompanied by a guest,
Pegmt.ti
both being on a pleasure trip, permits the guest
Co.,t DrIve to drive at the latter's request, and is in a position to take control of the reins at any moment, the owner
will be liable for an injury caused by a negligent act of the
guest in driving the vehicle. Compare Carlislev. Brisbane,
113 Pa., 544.
PARTNERSHIP.

The New York, Greene County, Court decides in In re
Hallock, 96 N. Y. Supp., io5, that a note of one partner
InsolvenY

endorsed by his copartner is not a firm debt,
and on a general assignment of the firm property

and the estate of the individual partners for the benefit of
creditors, the note cannot be allowed against the firm assets
until payment of the claims against the firm. With this
decision compare Citizens"Bank v. Williams, 128 N. Y., 77.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

In O'Connor v. Hendrick, 96 N. Y. Supp., 161, it appeared that a teacher in a public school wore the garb of a
Catholic religious order to which she belonged.
Religious
Instruction

Immediately before the regular time for opening

the school, and at the close of the morning and afternoon sessions, she said the prayers of the Catholic Church. The Catholic children were required to be present at the prayers, while
non-Catholic children were allowed to be absent. Under
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these facts the New York Supreme Court decides that such
acts constitute religious teachings, within a constitutional
prohibition against the state or any subdivision thereof
giving aid. to any school under the control of any religious
denomination. In accordance with this decision it is held
that a contract for the employment of a teacher in a public
school bound by her vows to wear the garb of a Catholic
religious order to which she belongs, entered into in disobedience of the orders of the state superintendent, is invalid
and non-enforceable. The case presents a very careful consideration of the delicate issue involved.

RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Prethrow
v. West Jersey & Seashore RailroadCompany, 21 Pa., 112,
that where a railroad company sells a single tickTickets
et for a whole journey which is to be made partly
by railroad and partly by ferry, and there is nothing on the
face of the ticket to indicate that any part of the transportation is to be by means of another carrier, the ticket imports
prima facie that the railroad company owns the ferry,
and a passenger suing the railroad company for an injury
occurring on the ferry is not bound to produce evidence that
the railroad company owned or operated the ferry.

RELEASE.

The Supreme Court of Vermont decides in Belheumer
v. Thomas, 62 At., 719, that where plaintiff's attorney
fradulently procured from plaintiff a release of
ValidityFraud
the cause of action and delivered the same to the
defendant on the payment of a sum of money by defendant,
who accepted the release in good faith, believing that it was
properly obtained from plaintiff, and the attorney appropriated the money to his own use, the release was a bar,
although plaintiff was guilty of no negligence in relying on
the representations of her attorney and in signing the same.
Compare Goodman v. Eastman, 4 N. H., 455.
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SEALS.

In Fourth Nat. Bank of St. Louis, Mo.*v. Camden Lumber Co., 142 Fed.257, the United States Circuit Court,
Corpomrte W. D. Arkansas, decides that the omission of a
ses
seal from a mortgage made by a business corporation is not fatal to its validity in equity in Arkansas,
there being no statutory provision in that state requiring the
use of a seal by such corporations, and there being a provision in the Constitution abolishing the distinction between
sealed and unsealed instruments made by individuals. The
underlying principle is of considerable importance. Compare Skeene v. Allis, 45 Fed. 149.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland decides in Oldenburg
& Kelly v. Dorsey, 62 Atl., 576, that where a materialman,
original or on being applied to by a contractor for materials '
Slateral
for a building, went to the owners and asked
Promise
that they give the order for the materials, whereupon one of them told the materialman to deliver the materials .and they would pay for them, that they would pay for
everything that went into the buildings, and for the materialman to charge the materials to the contractor and hold
him, as well as the owners, their contract was an original
promise and was not within the statute of frauds. See however, Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa., 95.

TAXATION.

In Mattern, v. Canevin, 213 Pa., 588, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania applying the settled rule that taxation of
Charities

property held for religious or charitable pur-

poses will not be presumed, decides that a
mortgage taken to secure the purchase money of a church
building and held for religious and charitable purposes is not
subject to a general personal property tax upon money at
interest.
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TAXATION (Continued).

Numerous cases have arisen under the Taxation Laws
of Louisiana, depending for their determination upon the
sits of

legal situs of the personal property sought to be

taxed. A new decision, and one going perhaps
further than any of its predecessors, appears in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Board of Assessors &c.,
39 Southern, 846, where it is held that the particular manner
or instrumentality by which the moneys used by the foreign
corporation in Louisiana in the course of its business are
obtained is a matter of no significance in the consideration of
the liability of the company to taxation for the use of such
money. The moneys loaned in Louisana were the company's
moneys, and the notes evidencing the loan represented the
moneys so used in Louisana. The moment the moneys were
received in Louisana the taxing power attached as against
the company, and the tax created was not destroyed because
thereafter the company might remove the notes beyond the
limits of the state. Compare Corntoir National v. Board,
52 La. Ann., 1322; and Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S.,
Personalty

206.

A point of very practical importance is decided by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Philadelphiav. Pennsylvania Company &c., 214 Pa., 138, where it is
Exempion , held that a defense to a scire facias on a tax lien,
Portion"of Yerrwhich alleges that after the liability for tax became fixed for the year the property was devoted to a use
which exempted it from taxation, is not available. Compare Murray v. Taylor, 147 Pa., 481.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Schriver, 141 Fed.,
538, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth CirUndisclosed cuit, decides that a telegraph company owes no
Principal of duty to the undisclosed principal of the addressee
Addressee of a telegram to exercise reasonable
care to
receive and transmit authorized messages only, because injury to him cannot be reasonably anticipated as the c6nsequence of the lack of such care, and because such injury
is the effect of an independent intervening cause,-the act
of the addressee. Compare McCormick v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 79 Fed., 449, 38 L. R. A. 684.
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TRUSTS.

In Wright et al. v. Leupp et al., 62 Alt., 464, the Court
of Chancery of New Jersy decides that a provision of a
Spendthrift spendthrift trust, requiring the trustee to hold
Trusts
the principal and income of the fund free from
all claims of creditors and providing that the beneficiary
shall have no power to anticipate, charge or incumber the
principal fund or the income, does not preclude the beneficiary from assigning to his wife a half interest in the
income of the fund, as it may accrue and become payable, for
her support and that of her minor children.
WILLS.

With regard to the burden of proof in establishing undue
influence, the Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. i,
Und.
decides in King et al., v. Gilson et al., 90 S. W.,
Influence 367, that notwithstanding testatrix was under
guardianship as a person of unsound mind at the time of
the execution of an alleged will, the burden was on those
who asserted that the will was procured by undue influence to
show that fact.

